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Introduction
 
 To many early scholars, the Cold War epitomized bipo-
larity – between the United States and Soviet Union, between 
communism and capitalism, between liberty and totalitarian-
ism, between east and west. Beginning in 1991, however, schol-
arship informed by temporal distance and unlocked archives, 
has thrown such strict bipolarities into doubt and recognized 
the agency of the superpowers’ allies and satellites in the Cold 
War. These diverse parties, notably East Germany, waged politi-
cal warfare using all means short of conventional war to win an 
existential ideological conflict. One of the most persistent tactics 
focused on mobilizing foreign populations through propaganda, 
agitation and organization. Previous studies of East German at-
tempts to influence West Germany have focused on the late Cold 
War, particularly the 1970s and 1980s, leaving the early Cold 
War largely unstudied.1 To fill that gap, this paper asks how East 
Germans participated in the Cold War’s non-violent conflict as 
Marxists, and as Germans, in the decade from 1945 until 1955. 
Drawing on East German archives, this paper appraises East Ger-
man rhetoric towards West Germans as agitation, which targeted 
foreign audiences with a combination of propaganda and calls to 
action.
 The communist and German identities of East German 
leaders are crucial for understanding the complex and evolving 
approach leaders took to agitation in West Germany. On one 
hand, common perceptions of Soviet propaganda and agitation 
assume that the gospels of Marx and Lenin produced efforts 
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which harped on common communist themes and targeted the 
working class and minorities. On the other hand, historians, in-
cluding Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson and others, have 
observed that leftists in the Marxist and anti-colonialist move-
ments reclaimed nationalism and patriotism for their own uses 
after World War II.2 The horrors perpetrated by fascists discred-
ited the right’s claim to the nation for most of the world. At the 
same time, the Soviet Union, the left’s standard bearer, found 
traditional devices of Russian nationalism useful for motivating 
its population through the brutal demands of the Great Patriotic 
War.3 As the global communist left rehabilitated nationalism, did 
they inject it into their agitation when appropriate, as it was the 
case in a divided Germany? If they did, would they be willing 
to instrumentalize German nationalism, undoubtedly the most 
tainted of all national traditions in the post-1945 era? 
 In the decade following the war, the East Germans 
adapted their agitational rhetoric in West Germany in response 
to changes at home and abroad. This investigation, based on East 
German archives, demonstrates that East German agitation from 
1945 to 1955 initially conformed with the stereotypical vision of 
Soviet-bloc agitation as promoting socialist unity through com-
munist parties. However, 1948 and 1949 brought shifting politi-
cal objectives in the Soviet zone and Germany’s formal division 
into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) 
and the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany). 
German national unity and peace became the twin goals for East 
German agitation and movements in West Germany. Only four 
years after the horrors of Auschwitz, East German operations to 
influence West Germans consistently employed rhetoric priori-
tizing the sanctity of the German nation over traditional com-
munist objectives. Beginning in 1949, the National Front, a new 
umbrella political group based in East Germany, served as the 
most important vehicle for delivering new messages emphasizing 
national unity and peace to West Germans through its operations 
in West and East Germany. After 1952, East German agitation 
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retained its language of reunification, but it focused more nar-
rowly on spurring West Germans to oppose various treaties un-
der consideration by the West German parliament. 
Rhetoric in 1945-1948: Agitating for Socialist Unity  
 
 On May 8, 1945, World War II in Europe ended, and a 
shattered Germany faced an unclear future. The country, under 
the control of the war’s victors, had the potential to break with 
the Nazi period, sweep away tradition, and refashion society.4 
The mix of uncertainty and possibility fueled debate, about how 
the left ought to proceed in the Soviet zone and Germany, be-
tween three dominant political groups: Walter Ulbricht’s clique, 
which boasted Soviet backing, the ultra-leftists, and the “union-
ists.” The influence of Soviet military occupation authorities en-
sured that these disagreements temporarily resolved in favor of 
Ulbricht, who advanced Soviet demands for policies focused on 
unifying working-class parties. This section begins by examining 
the resolution of this debate, including the repudiation of both 
the radical leftists and the “unionists,” denounced by Soviets as 
nationalist. It then examines how East German rhetoric in and 
towards the Western zones reflected a consolidation around so-
cialist unity and working-class unity before this message started 
to break down in 1948.  During these years, leaders in the Soviet 
zone depended heavily on the Communist Party (KPD) as the 
vehicle for organizing agitation in the western zones, while infor-
mation efforts slowly gathered steam in the form of papers, radio 
broadcasts and providing materials to the KPD. 
Coalescing Around Socialist Unity
 
 As the German left experienced a post-war renaissance, 
three strands emerged contesting the primary concern for the 
leftist program in Germany, particularly in the Soviet zone. These 
factions were: the ultra-leftists, the “Muscovites,” and the union-
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ists. Although their debate immediately grappled with the im-
plementation of leftism in regions under direct Soviet control, 
neither Soviets nor Germans seemed to plan for Germany’s divi-
sion.5 Thus, the debate was not one whose resolution would or 
could be constrained to the Soviet zone. Ulbricht’s victory pro-
pelled rhetoric and techniques designed to build a unified leftist 
movement across Germany but controlled by the future rulers of 
East Germany.  
 Ultra-leftists emerged from the rubble of the Third Reich 
ready to immediately build new, local-level workers’ paradises. 
Drawing heavily from leftists who weathered the war in Germa-
ny, this disorganized strain sought to take advantage of society’s 
near-total destruction to immediately deliver on the long-awaited 
worker control of local industry and politics. The “Muscovites” 
were the small clique of German communists, including key fu-
ture leaders such as Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, who had 
spent the war under the Soviet Union’s protection and returned 
to Germany in the war’s final days as Soviet proxies. They were 
singularly concerned during these years with reestablishing order, 
maintaining their status in Soviet eyes and entrenching Soviet 
control over the zone. The third strand, the “unionists,” emerged 
in 1946 in response to early signs that Germany might be headed 
towards division. They argued that the left’s primary goal should 
be ensuring German unity above everything else. 
 The Soviet Union played a key role in the suppression 
of the ultra-leftists and the crystallization around socialist unity 
in 1946. In the vacuum left by the collapse of the Nazi govern-
ment, the ultra-leftists in some towns in eastern Germany set 
about building local administrations featuring red flags, worker 
leadership and leftist greetings and anthems. Although local So-
viet military authorities sometimes tolerated these experiments, 
as the Soviet occupation grew more organized, senior officers or-
dered the experiments be curtailed in preference for administra-
tions less alienating to non-communist Germans. By the end of 
1945, pressure from the Soviet military occupation had disman-
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tled most projects deemed overly radical.6 Throughout 1945, 
the Soviet Union and their Muscovite proxies also suppressed 
spontaneous drives for socialist unity, much to the confusion of 
ultra-radicals, and maintained that the Social Democratic Party 
of Germany (SPD) would survive as an independent party. How-
ever, early election results elsewhere in Central Europe returned 
results favoring social democrats over communists, casting doubt 
on the KPD’s ability to win Soviet zone elections as a stand-alone 
party. Thus, in 1946, Soviet authorities and their German lack-
eys abruptly changed course to ensure that Soviet proxies would 
remain in control in the eastern zone; instead of suppressing the 
left’s impulse to unify, they now forced a union at gun-point. Af-
ter a hotly-contested deliberation, the Soviet-zone SPD split with 
the party in the other three zones and elected to unify with the 
KPD to create the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED).7 The 
SED gradually became a vehicle for Ulbricht and his successors 
to rule East Germany, but immediately following its establish-
ment, it retained a significant role for the SPD and aspirations to 
spread to the American, British and French zones. 
 Between 1946 and 1948, the Soviet authorities success-
fully suppressed unionist dissenters, who challenged the growing 
emphasis on socialist unity as a threat to Germany’s national uni-
ty. After the SED’s establishment, the unionists argued in a series 
of public articles and private discussions that the German left 
should prioritize German unity, asserting that a unique German 
road to socialism required a singular Germany. These unionists, 
more so than the ultra-leftists, offered an alternative vision for 
agitation in the non-Soviet zones, preferring rhetoric and action 
designed to promote German unity, even if this compromised 
the nascent socialist unity project. 
 Sergei Tiul’panov, the director of propaganda for the 
Soviet Military Administration of Germany, led the charge 
against unionist campaigns.  Even before the unionists emerged, 
Tiul’panov instructed the SED to avoid any hint of nationalism 
and repeatedly lectured the Muscovites about the importance of 
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hewing to a Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. When 
the unionists leveled their challenge against the socialist unity 
project, Tiul’panov derided the “German road” to socialism as 
“residual nationalism and chauvinism.”8 By the end of 1946, 
unionist ideas fell by the wayside in both Soviet directions for 
and the German practice of agitation in the western zones. By 
the end of 1946, the unionists had been marginalized in com-
munist agitation in the western zones. In January 1947, senior 
Soviet leaders summoned their German proxies to a meeting in 
Moscow, described by Naimark as the most important of this 
period. Here, Josef Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov directed the 
Germans to intensify the struggle for the German working class 
in the western zones.9
Socialist Unity in Walter Ulbricht’s Files
 
 In 1947, acting on Stalin’s directions, Walter Ulbricht 
and other senior Muscovites launched a rhetorical campaign 
emphasizing socialist unity.  Speaking to officials in the western 
zones, they advocated a merger of the western SPD and western 
KPD into a single socialist party – replicating the model pre-
sented by the SED in the Soviet zone.10 Reports from and about 
West Germany also focused on the state of the left, particularly 
whether it trended towards unification or fragmentation. The 
SED’s work in the west (Westarbeit) during this year targeted the 
Western occupiers when appropriate, but primarily focused on 
other leftist elements perceived as barriers to a unified socialist 
unity. 
 In April 1947, Walter Ulbricht traveled to Frankfurt am 
Main in the American sector to participate in a KPD conference 
preparing for zone elections. His speech covered “the Moscow 
conference and the fight for unity and the democratization of 
Germany,” but Ulbricht’s earlier letters coordinating his appear-
ance made it clear that “unity” (Einheit) involved the working 
class, rather than the German state or nation. This correspon-
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dence discussed unity only in the context of the political parties 
representing the working class in the western zones, noting that 
the SED’s work in those zones should unite the working class’ 
political representation.11 Thus, “unity...of Germany” meant 
uniform SED representation throughout Germany. Likewise, a 
joint SED-KPD pronouncement issued after that conference, 
and addressed to the working class, discussed “all of Germany” 
(ganz Deutschland), but only insofar as the SED should replace 
the SPD and KPD as the representative for the working class. 
This quasi-program, proposing a range of policies associated with 
the left, including drastic land reform, cooperative control over 
businesses and gender equality, concluded with the statement: 
“prepare to achieve the SED in all of Germany.”12
 SED reports from later in 1947 and early in 1948 testi-
fied to the party’s focus on unifying the working class and its 
political parties, even if questions such as German national unity 
occasionally intruded. One report from mid-1947, surveying 
Walter Ulbricht with Mao and Stalin at a ceremony arranged 
for Stalin’s 71st birthday in Moscow 
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the SED’s development in the western zones, blamed the SPD 
party leadership, and to a lesser extent, the American, French 
and British military governments, for stifling the socialist unifi-
cation movement. It also noted that a committee coordinating 
KPD-SED cooperation was established in February 1947 with 
the primary task of overcoming division and achieving unity, not 
of Germany as a whole, but of the German working class and 
socialist movement.13 The committee’s principal task was achiev-
ing socialist unity, and its principal foes those West German left-
ists resisting East German campaigns, rather than the occupying 
powers who would oversee Germany’s division. One year later, 
reports on a “friends of unity conference” in the western zones 
discussed using this occasion to foster links between the KPD 
and other socialist parties, particularly the SPD, to create a quasi-
SED.14 Although references to national unity occasionally pep-
pered these and other documents from this period, those writing 
SED reports and planning SED agitation in the western zones 
sidelined this issue in favor of a different kind of unity – that of 
the working class and its political parties. 
 Between 1946 and 1948, the SED ignored the official 
division between itself and the KPD and instead directed the 
KPD in the western zones to emphasize the socialist unity proj-
ect in its own elections and campaigns. Although the debate be-
tween German unity and socialist unity had already begun in 
the Soviet zone, the SED’s directions to the West German KPD 
largely ignored or marginalized the question of Germany’s future 
unity. Guidelines issued to the KPD in the British zone observed 
that conditions were ripe for unifying the working class in this 
zone and instructed the party to work towards this goal. An after-
action report on the well-documented British zone elections also 
praised the range of campaigns and slogans developed for the 
election, which either promoted socialism or attacked the leaders 
of other parties, but never touched the issue of German unifica-
tion. Reflecting the East Germans’ overwhelming concern with 
opposition in the SPD’s senior leadership, the guidelines remind-
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ed the recipients to construe the SPD’s leadership as ignoring the 
working-class’ interests whenever possible. The SED’s officials 
did aspire to foster positive relations between the KPD and SPD 
wherever possible. Memos discussing election outcomes and par-
liamentary interactions between the KPD and SPD celebrated 
that “objective” (i.e. positive) coverage received by the KPD in 
SPD newspapers. However, while the two party’s representatives 
in local parliaments cooperated on some issues, KPD reports to 
East Berlin concluded that truly “close cooperation” was a distant 
prospect.15
 Resolutions and similar publications issued by the KPD’s 
local organizations in the western zones in 1947 testified to the 
rank-and-file’s readiness to embrace the SED’s instructions to 
fight for a unified working class and single socialist party. These 
resolutions, adopted by state and local party branches at KPD 
meetings, either did not talk about national unity or placed it as 
a secondary goal dependent on achieving socialist unity first.16 
The KPD at the state level also made public overtures to SPD to 
cooperate in state parliaments, although they seldom met with 
success. The SPD in Bavaria, for example, rejected one offer to 
form an alliance, citing acrimony between the parties on the na-
tional level, the KPD’s untrustworthiness, and the fact that the 
public overture revealed that the proposal was a cynical attempt 
to frame the SPD as a barrier to socialist solidarity. The KPD’s 
media also rallied around the cause of socialist unity, while pay-
ing little more than lip service to national unity in their articles. 
The first edition of Unser Tag, a KPD paper, ran a headline read-
ing “Socialists Unified – Germany Unified” but the following 
article focused exclusively on the need for socialists to unite.17 
Although not published in the Soviet zone, it nevertheless was a 
product of SED proxies in the western zones and aligned neatly 
with the general line taken by both the SED and KPD in the late 
1940s.
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Messing with Success: Crushing Socialist Unity Throughout 
Germany
 Beginning in 1948, however, the temporary crystalli-
zation around rhetoric prioritizing socialist unity shattered, as 
leaders in East Berlin purged social democratic opposition in the 
Soviet zone SED and gradually abandoned efforts to orchestrate 
a merger of working class parties in the western zones. In the sec-
ond half of 1948, the Soviets and their proxies in the SED leader-
ship realized that the time was ripe to consolidate their control 
of the party and implement Soviet-style democratic centralism, 
prohibiting internal factions or dissent from leadership decisions. 
Naimark traces this decision to strengthen schooling and purge 
membership to growing anti-Soviet sentiment in the Soviet zone, 
particularly from former SPD-members, and the Marshall plan’s 
economic allure. (Soviet zone communists were surprisingly si-
lent on the Berlin Blockade, even internally, mentioning it only 
as an element of western propaganda.)18 By October 1948, lead-
ing SED members from the SPD fled the Soviet zone and pub-
licly denounced the project, causing the SED’s communist con-
trollers to establish organs to expel any untrustworthy converts 
from the SPD who had not already left. Even as Stalin encour-
aged German communists to employ guile to avoid alienating 
non-communists throughout Germany, he allowed the SED to 
abandon any pretension to serve as a vehicle for unity or equal-
ity between social democratic and communist groups. By early 
1949, full implementation of democratic centralism marked “the 
end of the unity party in practice and in theory” as the SED be-
came, in the words of one defector, the “Ulbricht KPD.”19
 The Soviet occupation ensured that the Muscovites 
emerged triumphant in the debate over the future of leftism in 
Germany, as Soviet occupiers ordered their proxies to complete 
socialist unification in the Soviet zone and promote it with in-
tensified agitation in the western zones. However, by 1948, both 
Soviets and their proxies began to abandon the socialist unity 
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message underpinning these efforts. In the Soviet zone, the SED 
became a party explicitly replicating the Soviet Union’s Bolshe-
viks, and thus had no room for social democrat dissenters. But in 
the western zones the SED increasingly lost its allure as a model 
for leftist social democrats. With the rhetoric and goals of the 
socialist unity project vandalized and abandoned by Soviets and 
Muscovites, East German operations to influence politics in the 
west would require new goals and language.
Rhetoric in 1949-1951: National Division, National Unity, and 
Peace 
 1949 brought a dramatic change as Germany’s occupa-
tion turned into formal division with the establishment of the 
Federal Republic of Germany on May 23 and the ratification 
of the German Democratic Republic constitution on October 
7. Competition between the two semi-sovereign Germanys for 
legitimacy, recognition, and survival as the German state began 
immediately, and would persist for the next forty years.20 The 
establishment of two separate states, neither of which recognized 
the other, and each of which asserted its right to be the sole Ger-
many, contributed to a pronounced shift in East Germany’s po-
litical agitation in West Germany, as well as some change in the 
practices they employed. The content of East German appeals 
shifted from a rhetoric of unifying the German working class to 
one of unifying the German nation and thereby securing peace. 
This tapped into a sense that Germany’s division was unnatural 
and a growing fear of war and responded to the slow demise 
of the KPD and the establishment of the National Front for a 
Democratic Germany (NF). The GDR attempted to expand its 
organizational efforts in West Germany by founding National 
Front committees and off-shoots of East German mass organiza-
tions, deploying instructors, and supporting a decaying KPD. 
From home, East Germany also conducted an expanded infor-
mational campaign centered around sending literature, organiz-
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ing personal correspondence and mentoring West German visi-
tors.
 This section traces the rhetorical shift, which began prior 
to the NF’s establishment with a growing interest among East 
German leaders in working the national question into their 
agitation in western Germany. I then show how this approach 
continued to dominate after the National Front’s foundation, 
as highlighted by four core tenets: (1) an emphasis on national 
unity and peace, (2) a persistent critique of the KPD in West 
Germany, (3) a desire to reach all Germans and (4) a description 
of allies in West Germany as patriots rather than socialists. In 
terms of executing agitation, it suffices to say that the National 
Front grew in importance, establishing committees directly in 
West Germany to organize supporters there, while also directing 
campaigns from within West Germany designed to reshape pub-
lic opinion in the FRG.
Start of the Shift
 
 In January 1949, the SED created its West Commission, 
which coordinated East German agitation in West Germany. Ini-
tially, the Commission focused on the same economic questions 
and the working-class’ unity that drove political agitation in prior 
years. For example, at its first meeting, the body discussed using 
radio broadcasts in West Germany to publicize East Germany’s 
success in economic reconstruction. This type of economic focus 
occasionally recurred in the coming years.21 However, April saw 
the first East German attempt to weaponize the national question 
in agitation. Although the West Commission did not explicitly 
discuss the motivation for focusing on German unity, Germany’s 
blatantly deepening division between east and west, whether be-
cause of growing hostility between the U.S. and USSR, the Ber-
lin blockade, or the gradual consolidation of the three western 
zones, thrust the prospect of the country’s future disunity into 
the spotlight. Another important factor may have been that, in 
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the summer of 1949, Stalin recalled Sergei Tiul’panov to Mos-
cow. Tiul’panov had been essential in suppressing the unionists 
and driving the Soviet Union’s proxies towards the message of so-
cialist unity that dominated earlier years. His removal may have 
opened space for a return to a nationalist rhetoric, which could 
have attracted East German leaders for its potential appeal to not 
just the working class, but all Germans. 
 East German leaders expected a message focused on 
national unity to resonate with most West Germans, who they 
imagined considered a unified Germany to be normal but were 
exhausted by the conflict in German life over the past thirty years. 
At the time, a forty-year division was unthinkable for both West 
and East Germans. Despite their Marxist pedigree, East German 
leaders may have been predisposed to this narrative; the attitude 
that reunification was a fast-approaching, worthy goal was par-
ticularly pronounced in older generations, including those in 
charge of East Germany, who had only known a unified German 
state. Outside of the GDR, East German intelligence confirmed 
West Germans’ faith in reunification. Throughout the first de-
cade of the post-war era, this information came from travel re-
ports filed by any East German functionary or instructor travel-
ling in the FRG, conversations with visitors from West Germany, 
and compiled reports titled “Voices from West Germany” that 
drew from both public statements and private correspondence. 
These tended to confirm East German leaders’ belief that their 
compatriots in the West viewed national reunification as a pri-
ority, reporting growing West German support for a program 
emphasizing national unity and peace even into the 1950s.22
 By the end of 1949, the four core tenets of the GDR’s 
new approach to political agitation in West Germany had 
emerged. First, SED West Commission meeting minutes testify 
to the organization’s focus on promulgating narratives of national 
unity and peace. Second, in October, a senior SED official in 
charge of Westarbeit blasted the KPD for campaigning on un-
popular issues such as socialism and the USSR. Third, in pursuit 
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of a broad audience, the official suggested that the Communists 
should seek common ground with bourgeois West German par-
ties, instead of attacking them. Finally, Dahlem emphasized that 
West Germany’s national liberation required participation from 
not just the working class, but patriots from all classes. To ensure 
a consistent agitational message, the West Commission formal-
ized these positions at a meeting with the East German media.23 
The West Commission also made these expectations clear to the 
KPD, when they issued directions to the KPD leadership in 
Frankfurt am Main.24 
National Unity and Peace
 The National Front (NF) played a central role in driving 
the German unity rhetoric. While of marginal importance in the 
GDR’s legislative history, considering that the SED dominated 
East German domestic politics, a history of East German po-
litical agitation in West Germany would be wholly inadequate 
without an examination of the NF’s work. By November 1949, 
the slowly developing NF offered a new locus and inspiration for 
East German efforts to find novel, persuasive ways of winning 
over West Germans and motivating them to resist. Formally es-
tablished in March 1950, but active before then, the NF claimed 
to represent all of East Germany’s political parties and mass orga-
nizations in the People’s Assembly and presented a unified list to 
voters during elections designed to ensure continued dominance 
by the communist SED. From the beginning, the NF’s public lit-
erature and private meetings emphasized its crucial role in plan-
ning, organizing and executing East German efforts to woo and 
mobilize West Germans with a message of national unity and 
peace.
 One of the first platforms issued by the NF offered a 
clear example of the new organization’s philosophy and aims in 
its work. The NF proclaimed its commitment to a sustainable 
peace grounded in German unity, demanding a just peace treaty 
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and the withdrawal of all occupation troops – the sole “path for 
winning Germany’s unity and national independence.”25 Overall, 
the platform set a number of goals reinforcing the conclusion 
that the National Front took its moniker seriously: unification 
on a democratic basis, ending the special status of all parts of 
Germany (i.e. the Saarland Protectorate and the Ruhr valley); 
opposing remilitarization; opposing the return of German in-
dustrialists; and defending German culture against the “cultural 
barbarianism of the American imperialists.”26 It differentiated the 
National Front’s task in West Germany from its overall approach 
to the German nation. In the West, the NF sought to “enlighten” 
West German citizens about how policies enacted by Adenauer 
on behalf of the Western powers would lead to war, “destroy Ger-
many and annihilate the German nation” and then organize the 
“peace-loving and patriotic” into a network of circles capable of 
undertaking further work.27 The concluding call to arms was ad-
The National Front’s Headquarters in East Germany in 1953
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dressed to all Germans, “regardless of station, gender or profes-
sion” and promised that the NF was on the march in and would 
soon liberate all of Germany.28
 The NF also linked their national unification struggle to 
international events that provided ammunition to their agita-
tors, as was the case with the 1950 Prague Declaration. In Oc-
tober 1950, the foreign ministers of the Soviet bloc states met in 
Prague and issued a declaration affirming their commitment to 
the unification of Germany but voicing concern that West Ger-
man rearmament would prevent this. The NF leaderships’ reac-
tion to the declaration, which neatly aligned with the combined 
message of unity and peace they had developed since the start 
of the year, indicated how their rhetoric had matured. At the 
start of November, the NF’s central office accepted a proposal 
that called for committees in both Germanys to popularize the 
Prague declaration and its twin goals of peace and reunification. 
In West Germany, NF committees were to redouble their efforts 
to educate fellow West Germans through events, gatherings and 
the leveraging of members’ personal connections and influence 
outside the organization. The leadership also committed to ex-
panding the corps of instructors they had available to deploy to 
West Germany. The proposal instructed committees in the GDR 
to take over the sending of literature and letters to targets in the 
west, particularly leveraging members with significant ties to 
or history with Germany’s western half. The plan also assigned 
GDR committees the task of engaging visiting individuals and 
delegations from the FRG to correct western “lies” and lay the 
foundation for future correspondence and cooperation.29 The 
nature, extent and trajectory of these practices from 1949 until 
1951 are discussed in depth below. Here, it suffices to note that 
while none of these practices were new, their combination into 
a unified plan designed to advance a single objective was. In the 
following years, the NF repeatedly responded to both interna-
tional reunification initiatives and West German treaty ratifica-
tions with plans that sought to channel the full spectrum of their 
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capabilities into shaping West German politics on a single issue. 
 An emphasis on safeguarding German culture closely fol-
lowed the shift towards national unity as the organizing principle 
of East German Westarbeit. At the NF’s high-level conference in 
November 1950, the president of the National Front’s top com-
mittee spoke about the translating the motto of unity and peace 
into action. To him, this could be achieved by sending more per-
sonal-political letters from East Germany, engaging with West 
Germans traveling to the GDR, and expanding committees in 
West Germany. Crucially, he concluded with an appeal to all 
Germans by encouraging them to participate in these activities 
as participants in a national liberation movement to defend Ger-
man culture. Particularly, efforts at all levels and in all dimensions 
would do well to portray the GDR as at the forefront of a Ger-
man “national cultural reinvention” and in stark contrast to West 
Germany, which was allegedly sinking ever further in American 
“unculture” and cosmopolitanism.30 Indeed, even simple bul-
letins bound for NF committees in West Germany anticipated 
these high-profile pronouncements, noting that the cells should 
“show the movement for national unity, independence and peace 
in West Germany” and highlight the ways in which the GDR’s 
accomplishments furthered German national independence and 
cultural revival.31 East Germany’s close affinity with German cul-
ture is surprising for a state ostensibly following Marx, who fa-
mously claimed that workers had no nation.32 However, roots of 
this development may lie in the Soviet Union’s appropriation of 
Russian culture and patriotism during the depths of the Second 
World War and its strident condemnation of western “cosmo-
politanism.”33 An accident of geography further contributed to 
this emphasis on German culture. Many towns central to Ger-
man culture – Jena, Wittenberg, Leipzig – lay within the GDR’s 
borders, allowing the state to claim that it guarded the memories 
linked to these sites as well.
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Socialism’s Eclipse
 Despite billing itself as the guardian of German culture, 
there was one living piece of German history that East Germans 
in charge of West German agitation were eager to remake – the 
KPD. Communism and Marxism had their roots in giants of 
nineteenth century German philosophy – Hegel, Feuerbach, and 
of course Marx and Engels. The KPD itself had a proud tradi-
tion of defying authority and attempting to make revolution – 
most famously in 1919 when street revolutions to turn Germany 
socialist red instead left stained streets of Berlin and Munich a 
bloodier shade of red. 
 Franz Dahlem first encouraged the KPD to prioritize Ger-
man unity and German peace over German socialism in October 
1949. Nevertheless, the KPD’s inadequate movement towards 
the National Front’s line remained a recurrent challenge for those 
in the SED and NF charged with managing East German efforts 
in the FRG. In March 1950, the SED’s West Commission de-
cided again that the NF’s policy must become the KPD’s general 
line at all levels of its work. Particularly, they ordered the KPD to 
highlight the dangers of western occupation for the freedom and 
material interests of the non-working class in their campaigning 
and outreach. In May, members of the SED’s West Commis-
sion again lambasted the KPD for performing poorly in recent 
elections in North-Rhein Westphalia, losing control of unions, 
and failing to adequately engage with dissatisfied SPD members. 
While this last point is at first reminiscent of earlier pushes for a 
unified socialist party, they proposed rectifying these shortcom-
ings with political instruction on the importance of “the struggle 
for peace and German unity.” Statements by Otto Grotewohl, 
East Germany’s prime minister, exhorted to Germans to vote for 
national unity, rather than socialist unity.34
 Emphasizing this prioritization of reunification while 
avoiding the question of whether a united Germany would adopt 
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socialism was a deliberate strategy. In January 1951, a NF work-
ing conference with representatives from West Germany explic-
itly noted that all participants in the national struggle should 
put aside the question of how Germany would look ten years 
after reunification. Instead of dealing with this thorny question, 
the West German committee leaders and instructors present were 
directed to focus their efforts on building a movement that fo-
cused on the uncontroversial goal of pan-German understanding 
as the precondition for German reunification. Through the end 
of 1951, senior NF leaders continued to argue that national re-
unification needed to precede any conversation about a united 
Germany’s economic future.35
 From the outset, the National Front’s Western Division 
expressed frustration with the KPD, complaining that the KPD’s 
membership was ignorant of the national struggle’s importance 
to be an effective tool in the FRG. The exasperation is palpable in 
an August 1950 NF report condemning a KPD speech in Ham-
burg as adequate for a communist crowd, but wholly inappro-
priate for the broad audience they should be courting.36 Also in 
August, the SED’s West Commission issued explicit, actionable 
correctives to the KPD to draw parallels between the reunifica-
tions struggles of Korea and Germany and organize national re-
sistance.37 
These critiques underscore the importance placed on messages 
coopting both German unity and peace by the SED and NF. 
Yet such attempts to shift the emphasis of GDR agitation in the 
west did not go unnoticed or uncontested by KPD members. 
One Hamburg comrade, writing in June 1950 to the East Ger-
man government, protested the NF’s promise to respect private 
property and suggested that he might have to break with the 
party.38 Such pushback, in combination with the KPD’s persis-
tent narrow concentration on West German communists, may 
have driven the NF to explore the feasibility of alternative media 
outlets that would appeal to broad swathes of West Germany 
from a non-communist angle.
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A Broadly Appealing Message on a Broad Wavelength
 As the National Front propelled East German agitational 
rhetoric in a nationalistic and pacifistic direction, both it and 
the SED also insisted that this message should reach a broad au-
dience of all Germans, regardless of class, in both the east and 
the west. This marked a distinct departure from the KPD and 
SED’s narrow focus on the working class during the years from 
1945 until 1949. The importance of this widened appeal cannot 
be understated. It provides insight into both the motivation for 
the shift and the logic behind the East Germans’ tactics. East 
German leaders likely held a sincere belief that a rhetoric of soft 
nationalism and pacifism could win West Germans to the GDR’s 
cause. 
 By the middle of 1950, the National Front’s appraisals of 
their own organizational work in West Germany highlighted the 
emphasis they placed on creating a broad, national movement to 
work for national unity, rather than Germany-wide working-class 
socialism. These noted that, although the number of committees 
had grown prodigiously, members often confused the NF’s prior-
ities. To rectify this, they recommended reminding members that 
the NF’s essence was the national question, and not any other. 
Furthermore, these committees still drew heavily on the working 
class, which leaders in the NF’s senior East German ranks ex-
plicitly named a serious weakness.39 Notably, instructions for the 
NF’s West German committees directed them to improve their 
outreach to the commercial class, who might be influenced by 
promises of renewed trade with East Germany and Eastern Eu-
rope. This allegedly brought the NF success in Hamburg, where 
one NF committee claimed almost two hundred merchants as 
members.40 Some senior officials, reflecting the mentality rein-
forced by intelligence reports from West Germany, expressed 
frustration that this supposedly broad resentment of the United 
States, France, and Great Britain had not yet translated into a 
rapid expansion of the National Front’s movement. Walter Fisch, 
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a member of the SED’s West Commission, blamed this failure 
primarily on the National Front’s rank and file, particularly in 
West Germany where too much attention had been paid to the 
number of committees and not enough to developing the com-
mittees’ political lives to influence West German politics on the 
national question.41
 The focus on building the presence of the National Front 
itself and other mass organizations in West Germany was a tacit 
recognition of the KPD’s further decline. By August 1950, the 
SED and the National Front jointly admitted that the KPD drew 
ever fewer votes in elections and won ever fewer seats in parlia-
ments, although this decline was naturally ascribed to repression 
and “terrorism” by the Adenauer government.  Nevertheless, the 
participants at this conference concluded that their work in West 
Germany should center around mass organizations, particularly 
the National Front, rather than the KPD, now that elections 
seemed not to reflect the popular will.42 Simultaneously, during 
large conventions in East Germany designed to draw West Ger-
mans, they made a deliberate effort to limit the weight of the 
KPD in West German representation. For example, at the Na-
tional Congress in September 1950, they placed explicit caps on 
the percentage of West German delegates who should be drawn 
from the KPD in an effort to invite and perhaps turn West Ger-
mans in groups that were not yet working for East German in-
terests.43 The SED’s senior leaders passed similar instructions to 
the mass organizations operating in West Germany, challenging 
them to extend their membership to West Germans who were 
not already communists or in the working class.44
 Allies in West Germany occasionally encouraged East 
German agitators to redouble their attempt to craft broad appeals 
and movements. An evaluation of pan-German work in June 
and July 1951 discussed efforts to pass literature to and engage 
in conversation with West Germans at the inter-zone crossing 
points. It particularly praised one example in which a “friend” 
chided a West German for thinking that they were any different, 
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reminding him “that we are Germans and that Germans belong 
to Germany.”45 Another report from the middle of 1951 criti-
cized work in the border regions, but featured feedback from a 
West German in contact with East Germans who encouraged 
them to continue finding language that appeals to all Germans, 
rather than just communists or the working class.46 Both cases 
offer clear examples and implicit evidence for the kind of rheto-
ric that the SED and National Front deemed desirable – talk 
of Germany targeting all Germans rather than talk of socialism 
targeting only the lowest classes. 
 The insistence on a broad movement capable of reach-
ing all West Germans, regardless of political view or social class, 
remained constant through the end of 1951. A NF evaluation 
of a year of work in West Germany noted that the organization 
needed to insinuate itself in West German movements and co-
opt them for “the national resistance and the struggle against 
remilitarization and for the reunification of our fatherland.” Par-
ticularly, NF committees in West Germany were to engage with 
a wider circle of West Germans and support any willing to coop-
erate with the national movement. East German analysts argued 
that the supposedly quickening pace of war preparations would 
make ever more West Germans receptive to the NF’s message 
of unity and peace. To hasten this process, they encouraged all 
GDR initiatives in West Germany to denounce Adenauer as a 
national traitor and to show how the GDR worked on behalf of 
all Germans.47
Supporting a Patriotic Resistance
 
 The way in which East German documents often de-
scribed their collaborators and supporters further reinforces the 
impression that proper national identity supplanted class identity 
as a delineating factor between ally and foe. Authors and speak-
ers often referred to those whom they saw as furthering their 
interpretation of national unity as “patriots,” rather than “com-
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rades.” One proposal for a future National Front office meeting, 
for example, suggested offering legal help to “patriots” persecut-
ed by the West German government.48 In fact, this emphasis on 
German national patriotism traced back to the National Front’s 
earliest days. One of the first public National Front resolutions 
for a pan-German audience from February 1950 concluded by 
claiming that all who “love their German fatherland,” whether in 
the GDR or FRG, had a duty to join the NF’s ranks.49
 An uproar in April 1951 over Helgoland’s status pro-
vided an ideal opportunity for this East German blend of peace 
and unity. Helgoland is a small island off Germany’s North Sea 
coast, which the British military retained immediately following 
World War II for training purposes, thus making it impossible 
for Germans displaced from the island during the war to return. 
In early 1951, a band of West German youths illegally sailed to 
Helgoland, planted the German flag and a peace banner and 
were promptly arrested by authorities. This chain of events pro-
voked a passionate response from East German leaders and the 
assets they controlled on both sides of the border in an attempt to 
exploit what seemed to be a series of fortunate events. Agitators 
cried both for the return of the islands to Germans who had lived 
there and against the island’s use in British “war preparations” in 
appeals directed at the entire German population. The National 
Front’s public resolutions protested that the youths should not 
be charged for raising the German tricolor over German soil. 
Furthermore, they called for the island’s immediate return to the 
German nation and for displaced Germans to return and rebuild 
their lives there. This might have been one of the National Front’s 
rare successes, as the British government did agree to allow West 
German citizens to return to Helgoland and a British Labor MP 
wrote to the National Front expressing his satisfaction at the is-
land’s return.50 
 The passage of time only intensified this portrayal of West 
German supporters. Patriotism featured heavily in a November 
1950 guideline for committees and agitation groups in both Ger-
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manys. The central National Front committee tasked branches in 
both the west and the east with strengthening the “national re-
sistance struggle of German patriots in the west and south of our 
homeland.” German “patriots” could do this by organizing uni-
fied protest actions and supporting the solidarity movement for 
West Germans caught participating in strikes, protests, or other 
actions that might require them to pay fees, face legal action, or 
forgo wages.51 Patriots could certainly be found in the working 
class and the call for strikes suggests that NF leaders expected to 
draw significant support from that quarter. However, there was 
never any indication that the working class monopolized the love 
of the German fatherland. Repeated references to broad move-
ments and expansion beyond the working class reinforce the im-
pression that East German leaders expected patriots to be found 
in all sections of West German society. 
 It is important to recognize that national unity and paci-
fism were guiding, but not exclusive, frameworks for East Ger-
man influence operations in West Germany after 1949. In a state 
as expansive as the GDR and in organizations as broad as the 
National Front and the SED conflicting statements were inevi-
table. Just as the period from 1945-1949 saw isolated cases of 
individuals emphasizing national unity over class unity, the pe-
riod from 1949-1951 saw instances where officials continued to 
favor a rhetoric centered on working-class political unity rather 
than on national reunification and peace. Indeed, the KPD, as 
we have seen, was particularly obstinate, even in the face of re-
peated prodding from superiors in East Berlin. In East Germany, 
it was the SED that continued to mix messages through the end 
of 1950. In July, Otto Grotewohl, a figure closely associated with 
the East German SPD’s decision to subsume itself under the 
SED, spoke at a SED party conference about the need for the 
working class to democratize and unify Germany.52 In Novem-
ber, the SED organized a conference on the “Action Unity of the 
Working Class.” There, senior East German politicians offered 
speeches which fluidly switched between unity of the nation and 
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unity of the working class, while West Germans in attendance 
emphasized socialist unity in their controlled comments and 
speeches.53 However, these occasional conferences and comments 
were marginal compared to the pervasive invocations of peace 
and patriotism, national resistance, and national reunification. 
Rhetoric in 1952-1955: Narrowing Focus on Treaties and a Gen-
eral Collapse
 From 1952 to 1955, East German political agitation ap-
plied the same central themes and practices to narrower causes, 
but increasingly struggled to make a mark in the face of both 
German and global events. During this period, Germany’s de fac-
to division persisted and themes of national unity and peace re-
mained central to East German agitation in West Germany. Dif-
fuse exhortations to expand the national and peace movements 
transformed into specific instructions to counter individual West 
German initiatives, particularly treaties that more firmly drew 
Bonn into the Western orbit. Appraising work in 1951 and look-
ing ahead to 1952, East German planners expressed reserved sat-
isfaction with the state of work in West Germany and believed 
that conditions would continue to favor their efforts.54 However, 
these ambitions and specific instructions accompanied a series 
of events that posed serious challenges to the credibility of East 
German messaging and stymied their ability to operate directly 
in West Germany. Thus, by 1955, the content of East German 
political agitation had lost its confident promises of national re-
unification, while its execution shifted almost exclusively towards 
techniques grounded in East Germany. While the execution of 
East Germany agitation is beyond the scope of this paper, during 
these years, the scale and organization of letter writing, literature 
distribution and visitor mentorship each expanded. In contrast, 
activities in West Germany, particularly around the National 
Front (NF) and mass organizations, increasingly decayed. 
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Continuing the Rhetoric of a Broad, National Campaign
 
 As demonstrated in Chapter IV, the National Front’s es-
tablishment accelerated a shift in East German agitation towards 
a message emphasizing national unity and directed to a broad 
audience. This surprising emphasis on appealing to all Germans, 
rather than just the working class traditionally receptive to com-
munism, remained a constant into 1952. The first work plan of 
that year outlined a need to rally West Germans, regardless of 
religious confession or party membership, in a common struggle 
to secure German national sovereignty and to defend German 
culture, both of which American troops and weak West German 
leadership supposedly threatened.55 Internal planning documents 
acknowledged and accepted that East Germany would be unable 
to achieve its objectives in the FRG through the West German 
working class alone. Public speeches sponsored by the SED in 
1952 also explicitly acknowledged this fact and described the NF 
as the only tool capable of welding together all forces “rejecting 
the politics of division and embracing the politics of unity.” One 
particular speech concluded with an appeal to Germans of “all 
parties, world views, jobs and social classes” to immerse them-
selves in the battle for unity and peace that East German leaders 
saw themselves as fighting.56 Similarly, descriptions of West Ger-
man sympathizers as “patriots” saturated even reports criticizing 
the overall effort and specific shortcomings, such as an annual 
review of East German political agitation in 1954. This report 
featured explicit admissions that many West Germans no longer 
believed national reunification to be a realistic cause.  Yet the 
report continued describing West German supporters as patriots 
and ordered informational campaigns to further emphasize the 
national question.57 The western middle classes and nationalists 
targeted by such rhetoric and planning may have been indiffer-
ent to such appeals. However, judging by their public statements 
and private planning, East German leaders were committed to a 
broad, pan-German agitation. 
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 The most senior East German leaders affirmed the shift 
towards nationalism, and NF elites turned to these statements 
to legitimize their decision to prioritize nationalist rhetoric over 
socialism. During a May 1952 meeting of the NF’s leading coun-
cil, one speaker quoted Ulbricht as saying, “the central question 
is and remains the national question.” Based on this, the speaker 
argued that the task before the NF was to lead “Germans of all 
world-views, without regard to their party affiliation, to the ranks 
of the great national movement.”58 Likewise, in a speech in De-
cember 1953, the president of the NF, Erich Correns, noted that 
“...our serving minister President Walter Ulbricht ... has drawn 
the attention of all Germans to the fact that today it is less about 
parties than it was in 1947 – rather, today, more than in 1947, 
it is about the entire nation.”59 In these comments, Ulbricht not 
only explicitly renounced the overwhelming but narrow focus 
of the 1940s on replicating the SED in West Germany, but also 
Dr. Erich Correns, President of the National 
German Front, in 1961 
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condoned the rhetorical turn towards agitation founded on Ger-
man sovereignty, identity, and independence. Correns’ speech 
offered a stellar example of the narrative to which Ulbricht was 
referring. Correns listed a standard battery of complaints – Ade-
nauer’s national betrayal and the ruin of West German culture by 
American “gangsters” – and proposed now-standard solutions –
protests, efforts to “save German national culture,” and petitions 
publicizing Soviet and East German peace and unity proposals.60
 The rhetorical priority on reunification and peace was 
not the sole preserve of the elite, but continued to bubble up 
in the reports percolating from the local- and district-level or-
ganizations towards the national archives. One such report, on 
East German informational efforts, framed these as necessary to 
convince West Germans of the need to “do everything in order 
to secure peace and German unity.”61 This statement not only 
conformed to the twin themes dominating agitation after 1949, 
but also clearly revealed a belief that informational efforts should 
produce action. However, the local level was far from uniformly 
disciplined around the message that East German leaders de-
sired, particularly in cases involving the West German Commu-
nist Party (KPD). A KPD conference in 1952 oscillated between 
condemnations of the American cosmopolitanism’s deleterious 
effects on German culture and full-throated defenses of Bol-
shevism, Marx, and Lenin. Similarly, the KPD’s own report to 
East Berlin on their work to advance the “broad patriotic protest 
movement” focused on unions and other entities traditionally 
part of the left.62
Attempted Ban of the KPD
 Although East German leaders sharply criticized the 
KPD for its failure to embrace the nationalist-pacifist rhetori-
cal line, they did defend it from external efforts to eliminate the 
party. In 1952, when West German authorities threatened to ban 
the KPD on the grounds that its activities and message were un-
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constitutional, East German leaders and their operation rallied to 
the beleaguered party’s defense. The KPD avoided prohibition in 
1952 (although it met this fate in 1956), but this episode marked 
the first major challenge for East German political agitation in 
West Germany and the start of a gradual retreat from the FRG.
 Although structural limitations prevented this study 
from encompassing West German reactions to East German agi-
tation, Bonn’s attempt to ban the KPD offers some insight into 
West German awareness of East German efforts. The charges laid 
against the KPD described it as part of East German political 
activity designed to further German reunification. The Adenauer 
government not only understood the national question’s signifi-
cance in East German agitation, it also knew that the KPD was 
not the sole vehicle for East German influence in the Bonn Re-
public. A crucial passage noted that there existed in the FRG 
“a network of associations, which are either part of the GDR’s 
‘mass organizations’ or of ‘pan-German character’ that the NF 
influenced, even when they [the organizations] were organized 
in West Germany.” The indictment identified almost 40 West 
German organizations considered to be proxies for the East Ger-
man government, whether wittingly or otherwise.63 West Ger-
man authorities clearly aimed to stifle East Germany’s influence 
operations and recognized the NF’s role in these activities. 
 As the FRG connected the SED and NF in East Ger-
many to a stunning array of organizations and groups in West 
Germany, East German leaders scrambled to deny the charg-
es against the KPD. They unsurprisingly concluded that this 
was a U.S.-driven effort to deepen German divisions, advance 
American interests, and prepare for war. In their response to the 
charges, East Germans claimed that a ban would contravene the 
will of the burgeoning national reunification movement in both 
Germanys.64 Unsigned letters, ostensibly by West Germans, but 
edited by Ulbricht’s East Berlin office, defended the KPD on na-
tional grounds and charged West German leadership with na-
tional treason for their supposed subservience to the U.S.65
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 While East Germany’s leaders publicly presented the 
KPD as an indispensable party in the struggle for reunification, 
private communications revealed grave misgivings about the 
KPD’s actual commitment to the national project. Reports sub-
mitted to Walter Ulbricht’s office at the time sharply criticized 
the KPD’s poor activity and organization at the local level and its 
reluctance to make any effort at finding common ground with 
the bourgeois parties through the national question.66 While in-
ternal assessments did not clearly state the indictment’s direct ef-
fects on the KPD and NF in West Germany, reports had already 
discussed both organizations’ fraying networks and a high-profile 
charge would have accelerated this unravelling.    
Narrowing Specificity on Treaties
 
 While nationalist appeals between 1949 and 1951 had 
diffuse goals of shaping West German opinion and expanding 
the national movement, the following years brought this rhet-
oric to bear on a series of concrete causes – preventing West 
German from agreeing to treaties with the West. East German 
leaders devoted significant energy to these efforts because they 
entailed diplomatic recognition of the FRG, entrenched West 
Germany in the capitalist camp, and paved the way for West 
German remilitarization, which could threaten the “correlation 
of forces” between the communist and capitalist blocs. As early as 
1951, East German planners framed West German participation 
in western treaties as initiatives that their operations in both parts 
of Germany should oppose.67 However, East German organiza-
tional and informational operations only focused upon opposing 
treaties beginning in 1953. Despite East Germany concentrating 
their national-patriotic and pacifistic agitation on these treaties, 
West Germany proceeded to sign and ratify the Bonn-Paris con-
ventions (also known as the Generalvertrag, signed May 1952, 
revised October 1954, implemented May 1955) and European 
Defense Treaty (ratified in Germany in 1953, but torpedoed by 
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France in 1954).
 The Bonn-Paris treaty signed in May 1952 offered the 
first test case regarding the possibility of disrupting a treaty’s rati-
fication through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposi-
tion. In November 1952, the presiding member of the NF’s as-
sembly, Dr. Erich Correns, urged Germans in both East and West 
to agitate against the Bonn-Paris treaty and to remind members 
of the Bundestag, the West German parliament, of their duty to 
reject it. These treaties, he noted, could “only bring about the 
unhappiness and annihilation of our nation.”68 This appeal was 
premeditated. Two days prior to the speech, Dr. Correns had ex-
plained at a planning meeting that the NF must “intensify politi-
cal activity” in order to prevent the Bonn-Paris Treaty’s ratifica-
tion in the FRG. Furthermore, he expected both the NF at large 
and the KPD’s representatives in the Bundestag to explain how 
opposing the treaty would contribute to strengthening national 
resistance and furthering national reunification.69 Thus, the NF 
and SED’s leaders preserved the broad, pan-German, class-tran-
scending appeals that they had developed in the previous two 
years and turned them towards treaties relevant to the German 
question’s resolution.
 The NF, attempting to influence the Bundestag, compiled 
lists of members across parties who had either voiced opposition 
to any of the treaties under consideration, or at the very least 
demonstrated no overt hostility to the GDR or KPD. These lists 
were sometimes forwarded to correspondence circles, suggesting 
that they were primarily destined for the local levels, where they 
would be used to inundate the representatives with letters from 
the GDR. The lists included parliamentarians from all the major 
West German parties (the Free Democrats, Christian Democrats, 
and Social Democrats), attesting to the NF’s determination to 
appeal broadly to Germans, both in the general population and 
in West German parliaments.70 Beginning in January 1953, plan-
ners in the NF division responsible for coordinating agitation in 
and towards West German called on committees to send letters 
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and literature directly to Bundestag members – including those 
listed in these compendiums.71
 Other documents included directions for correspon-
dence circles on rebutting the SPD’s “conservative” arguments 
in support of the European Defense Treaty. These offered specific 
arguments about Adenauer and the SPD leadership – namely 
that neither cared about “the fate of the German nation” – for 
East German writers to replicate. For material, they provided 
quotes from Adenauer that portrayed him as a willing American 
puppet and noted that the debate over a Western European col-
lective security apparatus carried existential implications for the 
German nation. War between the blocs would annihilate Ger-
many – intertwining the goals of national unity, national survival 
and global peace. Such directions offered clear evidence that East 
Germany did not sacrifice broad appeals amidst the pivot to-
wards opposing West German treaties. In fact, these directions 
explicitly described as imperative the need to mobilize the entire 
GDR population, not just workers, to write letters that could 
produce a unified national movement. To those writing this re-
port and others, letters would not contribute to socialism’s spread 
but would instead reunify a divided Germany through German 
efforts alone.72
 Even as assets in West Germany deteriorated in 1954 and 
1955, East German leaders continued to bring their agitation 
to bear against Western treaty initiatives. In December 1954, 
the NF’s National Council issued a statement framing the Paris 
Treaty as a step towards war and away from fostering understand-
ing between Germans split by the intra-German border, thereby 
staying true to their two cardinal themes. After describing resist-
ing the “Paris War-Pact” as the “great national task of all Ger-
man people,” the declaration concluded by noting that German 
patriots across both Germanys could themselves secure a peaceful 
reunification. The working class received a passing mention in 
the closing lines. But this declaration, intended in large part for 
West German consumption, held aloft the prospect of national 
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reunification, rather than a worker’s paradise, as cause for reject-
ing the Bonn-Paris treaty.73
 A 1955 report surveying the NF’s agitation during 1954 
testified to the transition from a diffuse attempt to develop a 
national movement in West Germany to more focused efforts 
against the ratification of individual treaties opposed by the 
Communist bloc. This report’s sweeping overview repeatedly 
and explicitly linked various aspects of their work to their efforts 
to oppose the entrenchment of the treaty system through the 
European Defense Treaty and other “war” treaties. It described 
these letters, conversations and pamphlets as contributing to un-
derstanding between East and West Germans, thereby advanc-
ing peace and unity, and trumpeted all new connections between 
East and West Germany as the key to unlocking German unity. 
While there is brief mention of West German committees, the 
sole example of actual work involved farmers in Rhineland-Palat-
inate, suggesting that the organization in West Germany, while 
not dead, had certainly wilted.
 That simple example, however, does offer insights into 
the NF’s simultaneous desperation and flexibility as they still 
endeavored to mount a final counterattack against the looming 
implementation of the Bonn-Paris treaty in early 1955. While 
East German-backed formal organizations in West Germany cer-
tainly shriveled during this focused shift towards treaties, officials 
in the NF’s central administration leaped on ad hoc opportuni-
ties to link their systematic treaty-opposition campaign to local 
grievances in West Germany. In late 1954, a coalition of West 
German farmers contacted the East German organization due to 
grievances over the effect American military installations had on 
their livelihoods. Those in the office responsible for work in West 
Germany thought they recognized the situation's potential, and, 
in January 1955, issued instructions to East German farmers af-
filiated with the NF to exchange letters with their West German 
peers and ascribe their suffering to the Paris Treaty’s provisions.74 
Nevertheless, the absence of any instructions for NF cells in the 
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FRG to contact or work with the West German farmers is strik-
ing. By early 1955, the East Germans in charge of implement-
ing the influence campaign were reduced to relying on one-off 
events. At this point, East German efforts to shape West German 
politics retained ambitious goals but were completely dependent 
on informational efforts from East Germany to achieve them.
Sustaining a National Anti-Treaty Message in 1954 and 1955
 
 In 1954 and 1955, East German focused its political 
agitation on condemning West German treaties by emphasizing 
national unity and peace, while adjusting to increasingly limit-
ed possibilities to act within West Germany. In May 1954, NF 
leadership meetings addressed East German efforts to influence 
West German politics. On May 10, the conversation centered 
on youth protests in West Germany, yielding admissions from 
both NF and Free German Youth (FDJ) leaders that they lacked 
any real influence with the promising youth groups. During that 
meeting, Dr. Erich Correns, the NF’s president, first explained 
that a forthcoming East German appeal should feature “a picture 
of Germany appealing to all patriots.” Four days later, another se-
nior leader in the East German Westarbeit clarified to colleagues 
that the forthcoming manifesto should strictly avoid socialist lan-
guage, as it was designed to appeal to West Germans who agreed 
with the East German “...opposition to the European Defense 
Treaty, but [were] not yet all on the territory of democracy.”75 
Yet again, leaders in the NF deliberately tailored their message 
toward the national and militarization issues they imagined were 
dear to West Germans and consciously sought to avoid conjuring 
the specter of socialism. 
 Those coordinating agitation remained so committed 
to a rhetoric prioritizing national reunification and peace that 
they were willing to condone attacks on communism itself. At 
a NF conference in May 1955, Correns singled out a protest on 
January 29 in Frankfurt am Main for praise and as evidence of 
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a West German impulse towards unity, democracy, and peace. 
This protest group met in Frankfurt’s Paul’s Church, where early 
German nationalists made an abortive bid for German unifica-
tion in 1848. Like those early national heroes, this protest did 
convene under a program promoting German unity. However, 
protesters also convened under banners decrying communism.76 
Despite this hostility toward communism, Correns argued that 
this gathering, like its 1848 predecessor, should be lauded as a 
step towards a single German state. In earlier years, the NF had 
condemned the Neuheimer Kreis for unacceptable positions on 
German neutrality and compiled lists of targetable Bundestag 
members based in part on whether they attacked the leftist move-
ment. That, in 1955, an openly anti-communist movement re-
ceived unqualified praise from the NF’s president was astounding 
and signaled how dramatically East Germany’s networks in the 
FRG had collapsed.
 Even as their strength in West Germany withered, those 
in charge of East German agitation retained aspirations to oper-
ate freely in West Germany, believing that their efforts had borne 
some fruit. In the same speech, Correns credited the NF’s in-
formational work for holding up the West German army’s es-
tablishment and reinforcing patriots.77 The public appeal pub-
lished at the conference’s end clearly aspired to galvanize broad 
support against the Bonn-Paris both on national and personal 
grounds. To entice businessmen and the middle class to join the 
national resistance movement, the appeal promised trade with 
Eastern Europe. At the same time, the declaration asserted that 
the Bonn-Paris Treaty’s repudiation was a precondition for Ger-
many to “enjoy once again national unity and sovereignty.”78 The 
SED still explored opportunities to exploit West German agents 
when they had the chance, as they did in the summer of 1955 
in North-Rhine Westphalia. In this case, a SPD party member 
contacted the SED, offering to provide addresses and deliver agi-
tational literature in West Germany. Notably, he did not offer to 
join his local NF chapter, but seems to have offered his services 
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directly to the SED in East Germany.79 Similarly, East German 
planners still compiled detailed lists of SPD functionaries for 
each West German state, including their roles, history of contact 
with the GDR, and comments such as “ready to help” and “ready 
to be contacted.”80
 Yet, by the end of 1955, the operation stagnated. A report 
about future preparations for pan-German work simply called 
on members to develop the same techniques more energetically 
and with greater participation from mass organizations. Reports 
raised the same issues —incomplete information, lackluster en-
gagement, and incorrect positions on the national question— and 
gave the same prescriptions without any effort to explore new ap-
proaches or rhetoric. A “Program Clarification” pamphlet issued 
in November featured fiery language, including charges that the 
Bonn Government employed political subversion in the GDR. 
A few pages were dedicated to discussing the NF’s pan-German 
task connecting East and West Germans, but much of the pam-
phlet simply encouraged East Germans to dedicate themselves to 
East German development, on the logic that every small victory 
for the GDR was a step towards reunification.81 What little sup-
port still existed within West Germany was also rapidly evaporat-
ing. One report in Ulbricht’s files, compiled from West German 
contacts in November 1955, noted that many in the previously 
sympathetic leftist SPD faction now claimed that the USSR and 
GDR contributed to global tensions as much as the “imperialis-
tic” U.S. and FRG. Other SPD members doubted that Germans 
alone could achieve reunification, believing instead that the mat-
ter lay in the hands of the four powers.82
Late 1955 and Looking Ahead
 
 How did the content of East German agitation develop 
after 1955? Although this question lies outside the scope set in 
this thesis, it seems likely that national unity increasingly lost its 
allure for both West German targets and East German agitators. 
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Both global developments—most importantly the four-power 
conference’s failure in 1954 and the success of Adenauer’s trip 
to Moscow in September 1955—and popular rejection of the 
GDR amid fading hopes for reunification could have driven this 
process. In any case, by the end of 1955, East German leaders 
downgraded their ambitions, dropping their confident assertions 
that immediate reunification was near and admitting publicly 
that this goal lay beyond their powers. 
 By September, the NF’s programs shifted from talk of 
national reunification to national détente. Several speakers at the 
NF’s September assembly repeatedly announced that the organi-
zation’s task now was to work towards national détente across all 
social classes, an assignment facilitated by Adenauer’s landmark 
trip to Moscow in the summer of 1955. The public call pub-
lished after the conference framed reunification as a government-
level task and détente as a job for the masses. This re-calibration 
of East German agitation was an attempt to accommodate the 
difficult fact that East Germany’s sponsors in Moscow had now 
recognized the FRG. Indeed, speakers baselessly credited NF agi-
tation for Adenauer’s surprising moves in Moscow, claiming that 
pressure from anti-war forces at home forced him to accept an 
agreement in the Kremlin. Speakers singled out the Paris Treaty 
and NATO as targets for “patriots,” but this convention hinted 
at the start of a new shift in East German rhetoric.83 
 In early December, a statement of principle issued by 
the NF’s division overseeing agitation reinforced the appearance 
of new content in East German messaging. On the heels of the 
1955 four-power meeting in Geneva, the document explicitly 
admitted that German reunification was no longer attainable 
simply through pan-German understanding and resistance to 
Adenauer, and instead required significant changes in global poli-
tics. The authors, who clearly recognized that reunification could 
no longer serve its rhetorical purpose, did not revert to appeals 
rooted in unadulterated socialism. They continued to describe 
Adenauer as a traitor and encouraged all Germans to take action 
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promoting cross-border understanding in expectation of the day 
of reunification.84 The 1956 New Year’s Appeal published by the 
NF offered similarly muted ambitions. In this case, the major-
ity of the statement instructed East Germans to help reconstruct 
their part of Germany. They were also encouraged to build ties 
with West Germans to spread GDR propaganda and agitate for 
an end to the Cold War and Germany’s division. In a key differ-
ence, however, instead of promising reunification as possible in 
1956, the declaration settled for a lesser aim of “taking a large 
step” toward achieving a unified German homeland.85
 By the end of 1955, East German leaders clearly tem-
pered the content of their agitational appeals, not in response to 
the suggested KPD ban or to the 1953 uprising, but to the chal-
lenges presented by the USSR’s recognition of the FRG and to 
the fading possibility of reunification in 1955. This followed both 
a narrowing application of East German agitation against West 
German treaty ratification on national reunification grounds and 
that effort’s utter failure. Emphasizing peace in rhetoric and ac-
tion in West Germany may have been the future direction of East 
German agitation, particularly considering the close relationship 
between peace movements and Soviet bloc intelligence agencies 
during the Cold War. That question lies outside the scope of this 
project. As we have seen here, however, until at least the end of 
1955, East German leaders stubbornly stood by rhetorical ap-
peals emphasizing nation and peace over class and Marx. 
Conclusion
 From 1945 until 1955, East German influence opera-
tions in West Germany evolved dramatically, both on the level of 
rhetoric and action, reflecting the communist and German char-
acters of East German communists. East German leaders and 
agitators began their efforts to influence the western zones with 
drives to unify the left on the model of the Soviet zone’s SED, 
until the crushing of the SED’s social democrat wing at home left 
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this message unusable. After 1949 and Germany’s formal divi-
sion, national unity and peace remained the twin guiding prin-
ciples of East German rhetoric, with the early 1950s bringing a 
narrower focus in deploying this rhetoric to undermine treaty 
initiatives in West Germany. Novel developments and persistent 
shortcomings characterized the vehicles by which the East Ger-
mans brought their rhetoric to bear. The National Front offered 
opportunities to organize supporters directly within West Ger-
many and somewhat skirt the KPD’s toxic brand. Correspon-
dence circles represented a bold attempt to mobilize the East 
German masses and shape West German minds. Each period, 
however, also struggled with lasting issues of organization, mobi-
lization, and resources, and developing ones, such as the wither-
ing of East German organizations in the FRG after 1952. East 
Germany’s operations also draws out broader insights about the 
role of agency, ideological flexibility and geopolitical restraints in 
political warfare. 
 The trajectory of the GDR’s rhetoric supports the con-
clusion that geopolitics plays a decisive role in determining 
what influence campaigns say and whether they work. Writing 
on Iraqi influence campaigns, Samuel Helfont has noted that 
although Saddam Hussein’s regime employed “political opera-
tions” in the 1980s, they only gained relevance after 1991, when 
Iraq could more plausibly claim to be a revolutionary regime tak-
ing on the U.S.-led world.86 In East Germany’s case, geopolitical 
shifts did not bolster the country’s influence operations so much 
as force their leaders to explore new narratives. The events of 
1949 and 1950 spurred the shift toward appeals grounded in na-
tional unity and peace. Germany’s formal division into two states 
made reunification a relevant goal, while war in a divided Korea 
and nuclear proliferation gave peace a new urgency. Likewise, 
promises of national reunification lost their credibility because of 
key diplomatic events in 1954 and 1955. The final four-power 
conference in Geneva and Adenauer’s mission to Moscow both 
dashed what meager hope remained for a unified Germany and 
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may have precipitated a new direction in East German agitation.
 The role of geopolitical events and conditions, which can 
be beyond the control of a state conducting agitation abroad, 
makes flexibility an indispensable virtue for those seeking to con-
duct influence operations. The narratives that resonate with a 
target audience might not align neatly with the ideologies of the 
states or leaders implementing these operations.  East German 
agitators demonstrated flexibility when they abruptly embraced 
national rhetoric in 1949 in response to Germany’s division, de-
spite having suppressed East German unionists the year before. 
Throughout this period, however, throughout the period, East 
German agents compromised on the tactical level —employing 
nationalist rhetoric, cooperating with non-communist groups, 
and praising anti-communist nationalists— in pursuit of aims 
on the strategic level —spreading the SED westwards, under-
mining the West German government, and hindering western 
treaties. The East German case underscores that even notoriously 
ideologically actors can recognize the utility of abandoning or 
adapting ideological principles to win over foreign audiences.  
 Although East Germans needed flexibility in the face of 
global events that they were often powerless to affect, East Ger-
man political agitation in West Germany highlights their agency. 
The Soviet Union played a critical role in the story of East Ger-
man agitation in West Germany during the immediate post-
war years, but its role after 1949 is far less clear cut. From 1949 
onward, the private meetings of the SED and NF’s committees 
planning work in West Germany featured neither Soviet repre-
sentatives nor direct orders from Moscow. East Germans them-
selves drove the transition towards the rhetoric of reunification 
and peace, and the lack of explicit criticism from the Soviets or 
their proxies implies that neither group opposed this innovation.
 Indeed, recognizing the agency of East Germans and the 
tacit Soviet acknowledgement of East Germany’s adapted agita-
tional rhetoric sheds light on previously confusing episodes of 
Soviet history. For example, following Stalin’s death in 1953, the 
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Soviet Union proposed a reform that included passages stress-
ing reunification, peace infrastructure, and broad appeals to the 
people of East and West Germany. Hope Harrison notes that 
this emphasis has confused scholars, but my research has dem-
onstrated that references to national unity, peace, and broad mo-
bilization in both Germanys were well-worn elements of GDR 
agitation.87 Just as Harrison’s groundbreaking work highlighted 
Ulbricht’s critical role in lobbying his Soviet superiors for the Ber-
lin Wall, this research suggest that the Soviet Union’s approach to 
the German question at a critical juncture of Cold War history 
reflected a position pioneered by East German leaders and party 
members.  
 Still, however much East German influence operations 
exemplified agency and flexibility in the face of geopolitical 
changes beyond their control, their success in adaptation cannot 
mask their ultimate failure. East German agitation inflicted no 
casualties among the treaties it opposed, the Adenauer govern-
ment survived into the 1960s, and Germany remained divided 
for over forty years. What explains this persistent failure to fully 
exploit the opportunities presented by the leftist groundswell of 
the immediate post-war years and Germany’s division? Although 
measuring impact lies beyond the strict scope of this thesis, plan-
ners remained consistently unhappy with the overall East German 
influence operation. More fundamentally, East Germany’s rulers 
could not avoid association with the reviled Soviet occupation 
and compounded their poor reputation with political repression 
and economic stagnation. In a struggle for the hearts and minds 
of a foreign country, repellent regimes can render offensive influ-
ence operations impotent as quickly as weak messaging or sloppy 
execution can. 
 The Soviet bloc’s collapse thirty years ago drew back the 
Iron Curtain, but the recent revival of influence operations as a 
danger to democracy has resurrected both fears of Russia’s threat 
to the West and the language of the Cold War. While the Cold 
War has shaped the development of international relations the-
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ory and remains a popular vantage point for assessing contem-
porary policy challenges, applying that conflict wholesale to the 
present would be a mistake. Examining particular cases, such as 
that of East German agitation, however, can shed light on how 
core elements of international relations have both changed and 
endured. Despite echoes of the Cold War, the actors and actions 
have changed  —a weakened Russia stands in for a strident Soviet 
Union, and Twitter bot networks have replaced mass letter-writ-
ing campaigns. Playing to nationalist fears of decline is a tempt-
ing but superficial parallel, masking Germany’s unique situation 
after 1945. At a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin 
can be too readily credited with deciding everything within and 
beyond Russia’s borders,   this study’s most striking lesson is the 
importance of locating where agency is exercised in influence op-
erations. The Soviet Union tasked East Germans with political 
operations, but East Germans themselves crafted narratives that 
spread to both West Germany and Moscow. Today, greater at-
tention should be paid not to Russia’s leader, but instead to the 
radical European politicians courted by Russia. Ultimately, they 
determine the narratives and sow the chaos that have caused such 
alarm in recent years and may do so in ways unanticipated by 
Putin. Researchers studying modern influence operations today 
ought to ask whether the dog wags the tail, or the tail wags the 
dog.
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